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Abstract 
This paper applies nonparametric estimators to examine countries’ carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions and governance relationship. By using data for the time period 1996-
2010 of the twenty largest economies (Group of twenty, G-20) the dynamics of the 
considered relationship are analyzed. Six governance measures are included in our 
analysis (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of 
Corruption) as have been defined in World Governance Indicators from the World 
Bank. The empirical findings reveal a nonmonotonic relationship between countries’ 
CO2 emissions and the examined governance measures. In addition and with respect 
to the environmental policy makers, a significant difference on the number of 
governance measures influencing countries’ carbon dioxide emissions which is 
subject to countries’ specific regional and development variations is recorded. Finally, 
the carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship is highly nonlinear and appears 
that countries’ higher governance quality does not always result to lower carbon 
dioxide emission levels. 
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1. Introduction 
A vast amount of researchers have examined the role of government and 
institutions and their influence on economic growth. Acemoglu et al. (2003) have 
found that weak institutions are the cause for slow economic growth, corruption, 
political instability and low investments. Easterly and Levine (1997) reach a similar 
conclusion about the slow growth while Baumol (1990) argues that institutions 
influence entrepreneurship’s activities and determine whether they are productive or 
corrupted. Chang (2011) challenges the argument that institutions have a significant 
positive, direct effect on growth.  
However, Boettke et al. (2011) criticize Chang’s (2011) results by stating that 
property rights have a direct effect on economic growth while policies have an 
indirect effect on growth. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that economic growth is not 
affected only by economic institutions but also by political and cultural factors. 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) support that politics affect growth. Specifically, the 
size of government affects negatively growth, whereas government expenditures 
affect it positively. . Djankov et al. (2003) point out that government is a key factor 
for the protection of property rights and as a result to economic growth, because 
government can effectively protect them but also can violate them. La Porta et al. 
(2004) examine two institutional aspects which promote general freedom. They have 
found that independent justice promotes economic freedom while constitutional 
review promotes political freedom. 
Several authors (Rose, 1990; Matsuo, 1998; Rentz, 1998; Komarek et al., 
2011; LaBelle, 2012) highlighted the importance and the role of governance and 
institutions on reducing countries’ emission levels and increase countries’ 
environmental quality. According to Panayotou (1997) the relationship of 
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environmental quality and income growth depends among other factors on 
government policies and institutions. Dinda (2004) emphasizes the authority’s 
capacity to implement environmental regulation across countries as a main 
determinant of the economic growth-environmental quality relationship. Grossman 
and Krueger (1995) also consider government policy as an important factor of 
environmental quality pointing that as poor countries develop and become richer there 
is an increasing demand for environmental quality and ‘environmental stringency’ 
through governance and political institutions.  
Furthermore, Arrow et al. (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1998) recognize the 
need of inclusion of policy variables in order to describe the income- environment 
relationship throughout the growth process and the role of institutions. Institutional 
quality or governance, according to Kaufmann et al. (1999), includes firstly the 
process by which the authority is selected, secondly the government’s ability to 
manage the resources and implement sound policies and finally the respect of the 
public for the institutions.  
During the last two decades several variables for measuring governance (or 
institutional quality) have been presented in the literature.  For instance Hall and 
Johnes (1999) following Knack and Keefer (1995) have used an index from Political 
Risk Services, the government antidiversion policies index consisting of the average 
from five categories. This measure has also been used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
Glaeser et al. (2004). Moreover, Hall and Johnes (1999) employed the index of Sachs 
and Warner (1995) in relation to the openness of international trade.  
Rodrik et al. (2002) and Glaezer et al. (2004) apply a combined index of 
government effectiveness constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2003) while Dollar and 
Kraay (2003) use an index which measures the quality of institutions constructed by 
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Kaufmann et al. (2002). Knack and Keefer (1995) measure institutions using two 
political instability proxies. The first measure, political violence, is introduced by 
Barro (1991) and is measured by revolutions and coups, and assassinations, while the 
second measure is based on Gastil index of democracy
1
. Finally, another approach is 
Business International (BI) indices which include corruption index used by Mauro 
(1995). 
Given the fact that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the main determinant 
of countries’ environmental quality which play a major role over global warming and 
climate change (Harvey, 1996; Ezcurra, 2007), our study uses for the first time the 
World Governance Indicators as have been provided by the World Bank in order to 
evaluate in a nonparametric context G-20 (Group of twenty) countries’ carbon dioxide 
emissions and governance relationship. 
 
2. A brief review of the relative literature 
Governance (or institutional quality) is a multidimensional concept to be 
expressed by one indicator. Hence governance can be characterized by several 
aggregated indicators that each of them focuses on one specific dimension. 
Institutions contribute to the determination of public choice and therefore are of major 
importance in the enforcement and implementation of environmental quality 
regulation. Thus, the sustainability of natural resources and the conservation of the 
environment interact directly and indirectly with the institutional quality. 
  According to Deacon (1999), governments determine the implementation of 
the regulation of treatment of natural resources and thus the exclusion of the 
institutional quality of the estimation of the environmental quality might lead to 
                                                 
1
 Democracy Country Ratings (Gastil index of Democracy) can be obtained from: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/. 
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biased results. Bhattaray and Hammig (2001) argue that institutions affect the income-
environment relationship
2
 trough the effectiveness of the exercised policy.  
 One of the dimensions that a large body of literature includes is the indicator 
of democracy. On the one hand democracy according to some surveys affect 
positively environment. Congleton (1992), with a cross-country analysis supports that 
more liberal democracies pose environmental regulations. Furthermore, Torras and 
Boyce (1998) and Barret and Graddy (2000) find a positive effect of civil rights and 
political liberties on the environment. Li and Reuveny (2006) examine statistically the 
effect of democracy on human-induced environmental deterioration. The results show 
that democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality.  
Besides, Bernauer and Koubi (2009) combine in a statistical model economic, 
geophysical indicators and environmental variables with political ones such as 
democracy, labour union strength, green party strength, civil liberties and presidential 
versus parliamentary systems. Concerning the empirical findings, democracy level, 
presidential systems and green parties’ strength contribute positively to air quality. 
Neumayer (2002) verifies the positive relationship democracy- environmental 
commitment via a cross-country analysis, including civil rights, political freedom, 
voice and accountability indicators. 
On the other hand, Midlarsky (1998) using measures of environmental 
protection and democracy level determinants in a multiple regression, concludes that 
the hypothesis of positive contribution of democracy in environment necessitates does 
                                                 
2
 The income-environmental quality relationship relies on the idea examined first by Kuznets (1955) 
who found an inverted ‘U’-shaped relationship between growth and income inequality. This was then 
tested in an Environmental Economics framework known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
hypothesis. Several studies have verified the EKC hypothesis by proving empirical country level 
evidence (Ekins, 1997; Stern, 1998, 2002, 2004; Ansuategi and Perrings, 2000; Cavlovic et al., 2000; 
Andreoni and Levinson, 2001; Antweiler et al., 2001; Bulte and van Soest, 2001; Dasgupta et al., 2002; 
Halkos, 2003). 
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not hold. Chang and Cho (2005) also claim the negative relationship of democracy 
and the environmental conditions.   
Another dimension of institutional quality is the corruption determinant. 
According to Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) a broader definition of democracy 
includes also the measurement of corruption which affects the environmental 
stringency negatively. 
Welsch (2004) using cross-country regressions tests the effect of corruption at 
given level of income in the cases of air and water pollution. The effect of corruption 
is noticeable in developing countries due to amendment of their environmental 
quality. Cole (2007) concludes rectifying the absence of the endogeneity of the 
corruption in the results of Welsch’s study that the total impact of corruption in air 
pollution is negative for high income countries.  
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) investigate the separate impact of corruption 
and political instability variable on the implementation of environmental policy in the 
agricultural sector through a cross-country analysis. The variables of corruption and 
political instability interact and play a crucial role in the domain of environmental 
policy regulation. 
 Additionally, Damania et al. (2003) explore and verify the negative 
relationship between corruption and environment by extending the analysis 
considering the effect of trade.  Dutt (2009) tries to analyze the environment-income 
relationship in the context of governance and institutions such as accountability of 
government, quality of policy services, index of corruption and political liberties and 
civil rights. Bhattarai and Hamming (2004) examine the existence of EKC including 
the rule of law along with institutional indicators like corruption, bureaucracy and 
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civil rights. The study confirms the hypothesis of the importance of governance 
factors. 
 Rule of law indicators include the contract enforceability and property rights 
determinants. Kerekes (2011) in the context of a cross-country analysis indicate that 
property rights are positively correlated with air pollution but negatively with water 
and land degradation. Culas (2007) studies the EKC relationship between income and 
deforestation including institutional factors such as enforceability of contracts and the 
efficiency of bureaucracy which represents the government effectiveness dimension. 
 Still, the above determinants play a crucial role for the protection of property 
rights which are important for economic growth. Bhattacharya and Lueck (2009)  
estimate the importance of two types of property rights (monotonic and non-motonic) 
in the framework of the income-environmental quality relationship which is 
confirmed in terms of an EKC hypothesis.  
 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Description of variables 
In order to examine the carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship we 
use data for the time period 1996-2010, concerning the Group of twenty (G-20) 
countries
3
. These are countries from different development stages (i.e. they are 
advanced, developing and emerging countries) which together represent around 90% 
of global GDP, 80% of global trade and two-thirds of the world’s population. In 
addition it is well-known that they are responsible for producing the majority of 
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions and for designing, implementing and imposing 
global environmental policies.  
                                                 
3
 The G-20 group includes 19 member countries (as in our study) and the European Union (for details 
see: http://www.g20.org).   
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In our analysis we are using as a metric of pollution for G-20 countries’ 
carbon dioxide emissions (CarDio) measured in metric tones (International Energy 
Agency- IEA, 2011). In addition we are using the six governance measures (World 
Governance Indicators-WGI) provided by the World Bank as proxies of countries’ 
governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 2006). The institutional quality indicator 
constitutes of six governance indices which are measured in units ranging from about 
-2.5 to 2.5. Higher values are related to higher governance quality. The indicators are 
constructed using an unobserved components methodology (Kaufmann et al., 2010).  
More analytically
4
: 
Voice and Accountability (VoicAccoun) captures perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PolStab) measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness (GovEff) captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.  
Regulatory Quality (RegQual) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
 
                                                 
4
 The definitions are taken from World Bank’s site at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm. 
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Rule of Law (RuLaw) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  
Control of Corruption (ConCorr) captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. 
As can be observed from the standard deviations there are a lot of disparities among 
the nineteen countries under consideration. In addition, we follow the natural 
grouping between the nineteen nations (see table 1) adopted in South Korea meeting 
in 2010. This grouping has been in place for country members to be able to decide 
which nation gets to chair for the G-20 leaders' meeting for a given year (Carin, 
2010)
5
. 
 As has been mentioned by Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2009) nonparametric 
techniques are suitable for analyzing WGI since will take into consideration 
differences among countries in different regions, making comparisons valid in a 
unifying estimation framework.  In addition they highlight that when analyzing WGI 
measures in a nonparametric setting there is no need of correction of standard errors 
and/or testing techniques since the governance measures are generated from 
parametric models and their precision is dominated by the overall slow rate of 
convergence of the nonparametric estimators applied (Sperlich, 2009).  
 
                                                 
5
 We follow this sub-grouping in our analysis since it represents the “natural-internal” dynamics 
existing within the G-20 nations and thus it will provide us with further information regarding the 
global governance-carbon dioxide emissions relationship.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables for the period 1996-2010 
 
 
Therefore, in our case the investigation of the carbon dioxide emissions-
governance relationship for a country i  at time t can be represented as: 
[ ]
( )itititititit
ititititititit
g
E
ConCorr,RuLaw,RegQual ,GovEff,PolStab,VoicAccoun
ConCorr,RuLaw,RegQual ,GovEff,PolStab,VoicAccounCarDio
=
    (1). 
Equation (1) presents the conditional mean of the underlined relationship and as can 
be observed ( ).g  is assumed to be a smooth continuous but otherwise unknown 
function and therefore is not restricted to robust linear specifications. 
 
3.2 Nonparametric analysis 
Let the variable CarDio be the dependent variable denoted by iy  and the 
independent variables (VoicAccoun, PolStab, GovEff, RegQual, RuLaw and 
ConCorr) be represented as iX which is a q-vector. We also assume that all are 
continuously distributed with a joint density ( )xyf , , with a marginal density of iX  
defined as ( ) ( )∫= dyxyfxf ,  and with the conditional density of iy given iX  defined 
as ( ) ( ) ( )xfxyfxyf /,= . Then in a nonparametric setting the following regression 
function will take the form: 
Variables CarDio VoicAccoun PolStab GovEff RegQual RuLaw ConCorr 
Mean 301272.76690 0.48106 0.07682 0.71775 0.61177 0.52688 0.54662 
Std 427922.78260 0.85368 0.84836 0.81751 0.76001 0.92624 1.01307 
Min 8208.00000 -1.70412 -2.12546 -0.76010 -0.92848 -1.07124 -1.13966 
Max 2092239.16667 1.67285 1.39664 2.03012 2.03504 1.82570 2.23786 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5       
Australia India Argentina France China    
Canada Russia Brazil Germany Indonesia    
Saudi Arabia South Africa Mexico Italy Japan    
United States Turkey  - UK South Korea       
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( ) ( )xXyExg ii ==          (2). 
Following Li and Racine (2007, Theorem 2.1, p.59) the regression function 
can be written as: 
( )
( )
( )xf
dyxyyf
xg
∫=
,
        (3), 
thus we can estimate g by replacing the density functions by their nonparametric 
estimates. Therefore the estimate of the joint density can be computed non-
parametrically as: 
( ) ( )( )∑
=
−
∧







 −
−=
n
i y
i
i
y h
yy
kxXHK
hHn
xyf
1
11,      (4). 
Where yh  is a bandwidth for smoothing in the y direction, 
whereas ( )qhhdiagH ,...,1= .  
In addition ( ).K  is a product kernel function and ( ).k is a univariate kernel 
function that satisfies the following conditions: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ >=−== 0,,1 22 κduukuukukduuk           (5). 
In equation (5) ( ) ∞<<−∞=
−
ueuk
u
,
2
1 2
2
1
π
 denotes the Gausian kernel (see for 
details Li and Racine, 2007, p. 8-11). Moreover, the nonparametric estimate of 
marginal density of iX  can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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    (6), 
and  
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Finally, the local constant estimator or the Nadaraya (1964), Watson (1964) 
nonparametric estimator can be obtained as:  
( )
( )( )
( )( )∑
∑
=
−
=
−
∧
−
−
=
n
i
i
i
n
i
i
xXHK
yxXHK
xg
1
1
1
1
         (8).  
A crucial point to our analysis is the choice of bandwidth (i.e. the smoothing 
parameter chosen). For that reason we follow the local constant (lc) least squares 
cross-validation approach introduced by Li and Racine (2007, p. 69) choosing 
qhh ,...,1 to minimize the objective: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
−
∧
− 




 −=
n
i
iiiiqlc
XMXgynhhCV
1
2
1
1 ,...,      (9), 
where ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ ≠≠−
∧
−−=
n
il li
n
il lilii
hXXKhXXKyXg /// , which is the leave–
one-out kernel estimator of ( )iXg  and ( ) 1.0 ≤≤ M is a weight function (for details 
see Li and Racine (2007), pp. 4-14). 
 
4. Empirical results 
  Following Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2009) we construct conditional density 
plots between the six governance measures and countries’ carbon dioxide emissions. 
Figure 1 presents the conditional density plots
6
 between countries’ carbon dioxide 
emissions and the six WGI variables. More analytically, subfigure 1a presents the 
conditional density plot of CarDio with VoicAccoun, subfigure 1b with PolStab, 
                                                 
6
 For bandwidth selection we have used the least-squares cross validation approach (Hall et al., 2004). 
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subfigure 1c with GovEff, subfigure 1d with RegQual, subfigure 1e with RuLaw and 
subfigure 1f with ConCorr. As can be observed there are large dispersions for lower 
levels of governance especially in the cases of Voice and Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness and Control of Corruption.  
In addition it seems there is evidence of bi-modality for high values of 
governance and especially in the cases of Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and for Control of Corruption. As 
stated by Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2007) conditional density plots provide us with 
more complete picture of the underlying processes generating countries’ carbon 
dioxide emissions and governance. 
 Moreover, figure 2 displays the results from the estimations of nonparametric 
functions for 1996 (subfigure 2a), 2000 (subfigure 2b), 2005 (subfigure 2c) and 2010 
(subfigure 2d). In order to understand the visualization of the effect of governance on 
countries’ carbon dioxide emissions let us check the results obtained for the year 
1996
7
. The top left panel in subfigure 2a indicates the effect of Voice Accountability 
on carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, the top right panel indicates the effect of 
PolStab, the middle left panel indicates the effect of GovEff and the middle right the 
effect of RegQual. Finally, the third row of panels in subfigure 2a indicates the effect 
of RuLaw (bottom left panel) and the effect of ConCorr (bottom right panel).  
 
                                                 
7
 The results presented using partial regression plots (carbon dioxide emissions curves) since 
nonparametric methods do not yield scalar estimates of marginal effects (Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz, 
2009, p. 128). In addition the significance nonparametric tests (analogue to the standard parametric  t-
test) introduced by Racine (1997), Racine et al. (2006), Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008) have 
been applied in order to check the significance of the governance variables on explaining the variations 
of countries’ carbon dioxide emissions for each examined year (i.e. 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2010). The 
results obtained for each repressor using cross-validated bandwidths and 399 bootstrap replications 
reveal statistical significance for all the variables at different significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%). 
The analytical results from the significance tests are available upon request.      
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Figure 1: Conditional density plots of carbon dioxide emissions and governance 
 
1a  1b  
1c  1d  
1e  1f  
 
Generally, these curves are presenting the carbon dioxide emissions path of a 
country member of G-20 for a specific year in respect to a particular governance 
measure. In addition to the carbon dioxide emissions curves, the plots are also 
presenting the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. Therefore, as can be observed the 
curves represent slices of the fitted hyperplane conditional on the examined variables. 
In the case of VoicAccoun the results reveal that regardless the examined year a 
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negative relationship (almost monotonic) of countries’ voice accountability and 
carbon dioxide emissions is revealed. As a result the higher the VoicAccoun levels 
within the country the lower its carbon dioxide emissions will be.  
In addition when looking at the case of Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence (PolStab) we realize that the effect on countries’ CarDio levels is neutral 
except in the case of 2005 (subfigure 2c) where a negative effect emerges. Mixed 
results are also reported among the years for the case of Government Effectiveness 
(GovEff) on G-20 countries’ CarDio levels. A negative relationship for 1996 and a 
positive relationship for 2000 are also recorded.  
However, for the years 2005 (subfigure 2c) and 2010 (subfigure 2d) positive 
trends are recorded after certain GovEff levels, which after those particular levels the 
effect becomes neutral. Mixed results are also reported in the effect of Regulatory 
Quality (RegQual). Positive relationships for the years 1996, 2000 and 2005 are 
recorded but a negative relationship is realized for the year 2010 (subfigure 2d). When 
examining the effect of Rule of Law (RuLaw) on countries’ CarDio levels a positive 
relationship is revealed for 1996, 2005 and 2010 and a negative relationship is 
recorded for the year 2000.   
Finally the effect of Control of Corruption (ConCorr) appears to be negative 
for 2000, 2005 and 2010. But, for the year 1996 the relationship between countries’ 
ConCorr and CarDio levels exhibit an inverted ‘U’ shape. As can be observed the 
results are mixed and subject to G-20 countries’ governance changes over the years. 
Therefore, in order to ‘grasp’ the dynamic effects over the examine period (1996-
2010) we apply the same analysis for all the years having in total 285 observations.   
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Figure 2: The yearly effect of governance on carbon dioxide emissions for 1996 (2a), 
2000 (2b), 2005 (2c) and 2010 (2d). 
 
2a  2b  
2c  2d  
 
Figure 3 presents similar visualization for the G-20 countries as in figure 2. 
However since it takes into account the entire period rather than certain years, the 
dynamic effects of the underline relationships can also be observed more clearly. 
Furthermore 90% bootstrap confidence intervals based on 399 replications are 
presented
8
. In addition to figure 3, table 2 presents the obtained p-values of the 
nonparametric significance test following the bootstrap algorithms highlighted by 
Racine (1997), Racine et al. (2006), Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008). Table 2 
                                                 
8
 Since they estimate stochastic variation of hyperplanes, and not of univariate functions the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals are not symmetric Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2009). 
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presents also the selected bandwidths following the local constant (lc) least squares 
cross-validation approach introduced by Li and Racine (2007, p. 69).  
The results reveal that the governance variables are statistical significant 
(column labelled ‘All Groups’) at different levels on explaining G-20 carbon dioxide 
emissions variations for the time period 1996-2010. It appears that the effect of 
countries’ VoicAccoun levels has a negative effect on carbon dioxide emissions up to 
a certain level and then the effect becomes rather neutral. The relationship between 
political stability and carbon dioxide emissions it appears to be highly nonlinear being 
positive up to a certain PolStab level (-0.5) and then becomes decreasing in a 
nonmonotonic way.  
Furthermore, for the largest part of government effectiveness (subfigure 2c) a 
‘U’ shape relationship (up to 1.5) is recorded and then the relationship becomes 
negative again. In the case of regulatory quality (subfigure 2d) it appears that for 
lower RegQual levels (-1.0 to 0.0) the relationship has the form of an inverted ‘U’ 
shape, having a starting positive effect and then after a certain RegQual level a sharp 
negative effect. In addition for positive values of RegQual the relationship appears to 
be positive again in a nonmonotonic form. Subfigure 2c presents the CarDio-RuLaw 
relationship. For a large part of RuLaw (up to 0.5) the relationship is decreasing 
indicating a negative effect of countries’ rule of law levels on their carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
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Figure 3: Global effect of governance on G-20 carbon dioxide emissions for 1996-
2010 
 
3a  3b  
3c  3d  
3e  3f  
 
However after that point the relationship appears to be increasing up to certain 
RuLaw level (1.5) and then decreasing again. Similar results are also reported for the 
case of control of corruption (subfigure 2f). There is a negative relationship up to a 
certain ConCorr level (0.8) which after that point the effect becomes positive, 
indicating that higher control of corruption increases countries’ CarDio levels. But 
when ConCorr levels reach 1.7 then the effect after that point becomes negative again, 
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indicating that a further increase on countries’ control of corruption will decrease their 
carbon dioxide emissions levels. The results reveal with the most emphatic way that 
the carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship is highly nonlinear and appears 
that countries’ higher governance quality does not always result to lower carbon 
dioxide emission levels.  
Besides table 2 presents the bootstrapped p-values of the nonparametric 
significance tests
9
 when performed for the different country groups (see also table 1). 
Therefore, we will be able to detect if governance variables are statistically significant 
for all the countries regardless the group they belong to. The results reveal that 
different governance variables are important for different country groups. For instance 
when looking at the statistical significance levels of the governance measures for the 
countries in Group 1 (Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the United States), it is 
revealed that the rule of law and voice accountability do not affect those particular 
countries’ CarDio levels.  
Moreover, in the case of Group 2 (India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey) 
political stability appears to be the only influential factor. In contrast to Group 2 all 
governance factors appear to be important when explaining variations of CarDio 
levels for countries included in Group 3 (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico). Similarly, 
for Group 4 (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and the control of corruption seem to be the most 
influential factors on their carbon dioxide emissions levels. Finally, for Group 5 
(China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea) only regulatory quality and rule of law 
affect their carbon dioxide emission levels. Following those results it can be 
concluded that there is difference on the number of governance measures influencing 
                                                 
9
 Also table 2 presents the obtained bandwidths using the local constant (lc) least squares cross-
validation approach presented previously. 
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countries’ carbon dioxide emissions which is subject to regional/economic 
development variations. 
 
Table 2: Results from the global effect of governance on G-20 countries’ carbon 
dioxide emissions 
 
  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
  This paper by using nonparametric methods analyzes for the first time the 
carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship. With the help of several 
visualization methods the carbon dioxide emissions curves are produced investigating 
the relationship for the G-20 countries for the time period 1996-2010. The local 
constant estimator has been applied in our analysis alongside with least-squares cross 
validation approach for bandwidth selection. Moreover, nonparametric tests based on 
bootstrap procedures have been applied in order to reveal the statistical significance 
levels of countries governance measures on explaining CO2 emissions variations.  
  All Groups Group 1 Group 2 
 p-value Bandwidth p-value Bandwidth p-value Bandwidth 
VoicAccoun 0.00251*** 0.11865   0.61153 0.03206 0.54135 0.08624 
PolStab 0.04261** 0.11456   0.03258** 0.18649 0.00000*** 0.28518 
GovEff 0.00501*** 0.17338 0.05514* 0.08186 0.46867 0.10477 
RegQual 0.02757** 0.02757   0.01003** 0.29978 0.78697 0.09231 
RuLaw 0.00000*** 0.05507   0.87469 0.03083 0.82957 0.10603 
ConCorr 0.02506** 0.07275   0.04261** 0.16982 0.14035 0.13346 
  Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
 p-value Bandwidth p-value Bandwidth p-value Bandwidth 
VoicAccoun 0.02506** 0.05590  0.42857 0.02291   0.98652 0.02444 
PolStab 0.04261** 0.26381  0.56892 0.06851   0.27820 0.17569 
GovEff 0.05764* 0.07141 0.02757** 0.21454   0.27323 0.06877 
RegQual 0.07769* 0.09860  0.05764* 0.07297 0.05013* 0.14190 
RuLaw 0.03258** 0.10280  0.25063 0.04649 0.05263* 0.10344 
ConCorr 0.00752*** 0.09689 0.02757** 0.12851   0.12281 0.13434 
*10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level  
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In contrast to the parametric approaches, the flexible functional form of the 
nonparametric estimators applied, as they relax the assumptions of linearity, additivity 
and no interaction among the variables, helped us to reveal important features of the 
data. In addition the nonparametric methodology applied may help policy makers to 
understand “hidden” tradeoffs between countries’ carbon dioxide emission levels and 
governance measures.  
More analytically, our empirical results reveal that the carbon dioxide 
emissions – governance relationship is nonlinear. In addition it appears that different 
factors of governance influence differently countries’ emissions levels. In respect to 
policy implications the results reveal that increased government quality does not 
ensure a reduction of countries’ CO2 emissions.  
Finally, it appears that countries’ regional and economic development 
variations are shaping the way and the number of governance measures influencing 
G-20 countries’ carbon dioxide emissions levels. Therefore, CO2 emissions reduction 
policies should be directed towards those governance measures which are specific to 
countries’ unique regional and development factors.    
 
 22 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., 2001. The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91, 1369-
1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., Thaicharoen, Y., 2003. Institutional causes, 
macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50, 49-123. 
Andreoni, J., Levinson, A., 2001. The simple analytics of the environmental Kuznets 
curve. Journal of Public Economics, 80, 269–286. 
Ansuategi, A., Perrings, C., 2000. Transboundary externalities in the environmental 
transition hypothesis. Environmental and Resource Economics, 17, 353–373. 
Antweiler, W., Copeland, B., Taylor, S., 2001. Is free trade good for the environment? 
American Economic Review, 91, 877– 908. 
Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Constanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C.S., Jansson, 
B.O., Levin, S., Meller, K.M., Perrings, C., Pimentel, D., 1995. Economic growth, 
carrying capacity and the environment. Science, 268, 520-521.  
Barrett, S., Graddy, K., 2000. Freedom, growth and the environment. Environment 
and Development Economics, 5, 433-456. 
Barro, R., 1991. Economic growth in a cross section of countries. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106, 407-443. 
Baumol, W., 1990. Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive and destructive. 
Journal of Political Economy, 5, 893-921. 
Bernauer, T., Koubi, V., 2009. Effects of political institutions on air quality. 
Ecological Economics, 68, 1355-1365. 
 23 
Bhattacharya, H., Lueck, D., 2009. The role of property rights in determining the 
environmental quality-income relationship. Ecological Economics, 68, 2511–2524. 
Bhattarai, M., Hammig, M., 2001. Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
for deforestation: A cross-country analysis for Latin America, Africa and Asia. World 
Development, 29, 995-1010.   
Boettke, P., Alexander, F., 2011. Institutions first. Journal of Institutional Economics, 
7, 499-504. 
Bulte, E.H., van Soest, D.P., 2001. Environmental degradation in developing 
countries: households and the (reverse) Environmental Kuznets Curve. Journal of 
Development Economics, 65, 225–235. 
Carin, B., 2010. The Future of the G20 Process. Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, Ontario, Canada, available from: 
http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/11/future-g20-process. 
Cavlovic, T., Baker, K., Berrens, R., Gawande, K., 2000. A meta analysis of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve studies. Agriculture and Resource Economics Review, 
29, 32–42. 
Chang, H.J., 2011. Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history. 
Journal of Institutional Economics, 7, 473-498. 
Chang, Y., Cho, T., 2005. Democracy and Environment: The Effect of 
Democratization on Environment Outcomes in Asia. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, 
Chicago, Illinois. 
Congleton, R.D., 1992. Political Institutions and Pollution Control.  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 74, 412-421. 
 24 
Culas, R.J., 2007. Deforestation and the Environmental Kuznets Curve: An 
institutional perspective. Ecological Economics, 61, 429-437. 
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P.G., List, J.A., 2003. Trade liberalization, corruption and 
environmental policy formation: Theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 46, 490-512.   
Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Wang, H., Wheeler, D., 2002. Confronting the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 147– 168. 
Deacon, R.T., 1999. The Political Economy of Environment-Development 
Relationships: A Preliminary Framework, mimeo, Department of Economics, 
University of California, Santa Barbara. 
Dinda, S., 2004. Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A survey. Ecological  
Economics, 49, 431-455. 
Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2003. The 
new comparative economics. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 595-619. 
Dollar, D., Kraay, A., 2003. Institutions, trade and growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50, 133-162. 
Dutt, K., 2009. Governance, institutions and the environment- income relationship: a 
cross country study. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 11, 705-723. 
Easterly, W., Levine, R., 2003. Tropics, germs and crops: How endowments influence 
economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 3-39. 
Ekins, P., 1997. The Kuznets curve for environment and economic growth: examining 
the evidence. Environment and Planning A, 29, 805–830. 
Ezcurra, R., 2007. Is there cross-country convergence in carbon dioxide emissions? 
Energy Policy, 35, 1363-1372. 
 25 
Fredriksson, P.G., Svensson, J., 2003. Political instability, corruption and policy 
formation: The case of environmental policy. Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1383-
1405. 
Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2004. Do institutions 
cause growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 271-303. 
Grossman, G.M., Krueger, A.B., 1995. Economic Growth and the Environment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 353-377. 
Halkos, G.E., 2003. Environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur: evidence using GMM 
estimation and random coefficient panel data models. Environment and Development 
Economics, 8, 581-601. 
Hall, R., Johnes, C., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output per 
worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 83-116. 
Hall, P., Racine, J.S., Li, Q., 2004. Cross-validation and the estimation of conditional 
probability densities. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 99, 1015–1026. 
Harvey, L.D.D., 1993. A guide to global warming potentials (GWPs). Energy Policy, 
21, 24-34. 
Huynh, K.P., Jachno-Chavéz, D.T., 2009. Growth and Governance: A nonparametric 
analysis. Journal of Comparative Economics, 37, 121-143. 
Huynh, K.P., Jachno-Chavéz, D.T., 2007. Conditional density estimation: An 
application to the Ecuadorian manufacturing sector. Economics Bulletin, 3, 1–6. 
International Energy Agency- IEA,  2011. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 
IEA, Paris. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2003. Governance matters III: Updated 
governance indicators for 1996-02. World Bank Policy Research Department, 
Working Paper No. 3106, Washington, D.C. 
 26 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2006. Governance matters VI: Governance 
indicators for 1996–2006. Discussion paper, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4280. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2010. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 5430. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Zoido-Lobadon, P., 1999. Governance Matters. Word Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Zoido-Lobaton, P., 2002. Governance matters II: Updated 
indicators for 2000-01, World Bank Policy Research Department, Working Paper No. 
2772, Washington, D.C. 
Kaufmann, R.K., Davidsodotter, B., Garnham, S., Pauly, P., 1998. The determinants 
of atmospheric SO2 concentrations: reconsidering the environmental Kuznets curve. 
Ecological Economics, 25, 209-220. 
Kerekes, C.B., 2011. Property rights and environmental quality: A cross-country 
study. Cato Journal, 31, 315-338. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country 
test using alternate institutional measures. Economics and Politics, 7, 207-227. 
Komarek, T.M., Lupi, F., Kaplowitz, M.D., 2011. Valuing energy policy attributes for 
environmental management: Choice experiment evidence from a research institution. 
Energy Policy, 39, 5105-5115. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., Shleifer, A., 2004. Judicial 
checks and balances. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 445-470. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of 
government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 15, 2222-2279. 
 27 
LaBelle, M., 2012. Constructing post-carbon institutions: Assessing EU carbon 
reduction efforts through an institutional risk governance approach. Energy Policy, 
40, 390-403. 
Li, Q., Racine, J.S., 2007. Nonparametric econometrics: Theory and practice, 
Princeton University Press, Oxford. 
Li, Q., Reuveny, R., 2006. Democracy and Environmental Degradation. International 
Studies Quarterly, 50, 935-956. 
Matsuo, N., 1998. Key elements related to the emissions trading for the Kyoto 
protocol. Energy Policy, 26, 263-273. 
Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681-
712. 
Midlarsky, M.I., 1998. Democracy and the environment: An empirical assessment. 
Journal of Peace Research, 35, 341-361. 
Nadaraya, E.A., 1964. On Estimating Regression. Theory of Probability and its 
Applications, 9, 141–142. 
Neumayer, E., 2002. Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental 
commitment? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 139-164. 
Panayotou, T., 1997. Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Turning a 
black box into a policy tool. Environment and Development Economics, 2, 465- 484 
Pelegrini, L., Gerlagh, R., 2006. Corruption, democracy and environmental policy: An 
empirical contribution to the debate. Journal of Environment and Development, 15, 
332-354. 
Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., 1993. Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 7, 51-69. 
 28 
Racine, J.S., 1997. Consistent significance testing for nonparametric regression. 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15, 369–379. 
Racine, J.S., 2008. Nonparametric Econometrics: A Primer. Foundation and Trends in 
Econometrics, 3, 1-88. 
Racine, J.S., Hart, J.D., Li, Q., 2006. Testing the significance of categorical predictor 
variables in nonparametric regression models. Econometric Reviews, 25, 523–544. 
Rentz, H., 1998. Joint implementation and the question of ‘additionality’- proposal for 
a pragmatic approach to identify possible joint implementation projects. Energy 
Policy, 26, 275-279. 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., Trebbi, F., 2002. Institutions rule: The primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development. IMF Working 
Paper No. 9305. 
Rose, A. 1990. Reducing conflict in global warming policy: The potential of equity as 
a unifying principle. Energy Policy, 18, 927-935. 
Sachs, J., Warner, A., 1995. Economic reform and the process of global integration. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-95. 
Sperlich, S., 2009. A note on non-parametric estimation with predicted variables. 
Econometrics Journal, 12, 382-395. 
Stern, D.I., 1998. Progress on the Environmental Kuznets Curve? Environment and 
Development Economics, 3, 175– 198. 
Stern, D.I., 2002. Explaining changes in global sulfur emissions: an econometric 
decomposition approach. Ecological Economics, 42, 201–220. 
Stern, D.I., 2004. The rise and fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. World 
Development, 32, 1419–1439. 
 29 
Torras, M., Boyce, J.K., 1998. Income, inequality and pollution: a reassessment of the 
environmental Kuznets curve.  Ecological Economics, 25, 147-160. 
Watson, G.S., 1964. Smooth regression analysis. Sankhya, 26, 359–372. 
Welsch, H., 2004. Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country analysis. 
Environment and Development Economics, 9,663–693. 
